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The Effect of Curriculum-Based External Exit Exam Systems
on Student Achievement
Two presidents, the National Governors Association and numerous blue ribbon panels
have called for the development of state or national content standards for core subjects and
examinations that assess the achievement of these standards. The Competitiveness Policy
Council, for example, advocates that "ex ernal assessments be given to individual students at
the secondary level and that the results should be a major but not exclusive factor qualifying for
college and better jobs at better wages (1993, p. 30)." It is claimed that 'curriculum-based
external exit exam systems', CBEEES, based on world class content standards will improve
teaching and learning of core subjects. What evidence is there for this claim? Outside the
United States such systems are the rule, not the exception. What impacts have such systems
had on school policies, teaching and student learning?
1. What is a Curriculum-based External Exit Examination System?
Let us begin by defining what a curriculum-based external exit examination system is. It has the
following traits. It:
1. Produces signals of student accomplishment that have real consequences for the
student.
2. Defines achievement relative to an external standard, not relative to other students in the
classroom or the school. Fair comparisons of achievement across schools and across
students at different schools are now possible. Costrell's (1994a) analysis of the optimal
setting of educational standards concluded that more centralized standard setting (state
or national achievement exams) results in higher standards, higher achievement and
higher social welfare than decentralized standard setting (i.e. teacher grading or schools
graduation requirements).
3. Is organized by discipline and keyed to the content of specific course sequences. This
focuses responsibility for preparing the student for particular exams on one (or a small
group of) teacher/s.
4. Signals multiple levels of achievement in the subject. If only a pass-fall signal is
generated by an exam, the standard will have to be set low enough to allow almost
everyone to pass and this will not stimulate the great bulk of students to greater effort
(Kang 1985; Costrell 1994a).
5. Covers almost all secondary school students. Exams for a set of elite schools, advanced
courses or college applicants will influence standards at the top of the vertical
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curriculum, but will probably have limited effects on the rest of the students. The school
system as a whole must be made to accept responsibility for how students do on the
exams. A single exam taken by all is not essential. Many nations allow students to
choose which subjects to be examined in and offer high and intermediate level exams in
the same subject.
Commercially prepared achievement tests such as the CAT, CTBS, ITBS, ITED are not
curriculum-based external exit exams, CBEEE, because they fail requirement # 1. Students
have no stake in doing well on these tests. Where stakes attached to student performance, it is
teachers and school administrators who experience the consequences, not individual students.
The minimum competency exams that many American states require students pass to
graduate from secondary school are not CBEEEs because they fail requirements # 3 and # 4.
These tests focus on basic skills taught in primary school and lower secondary school. While
minimum competency exams have apparently reduced the numbers of students with very low
basic skills levels (Lerner 1991), the passing standard is quite low. The tests are typically first
taken in 9th or 10th grade and most students pass on the first sitting. High school transcripts
indicate only whether the student eventually passes the test, not achievement levels above the
minimum. Thus, for the great majority of students who pass them on the first try, the tests no
longer stimulate study. Incentive effects are focused on the small minority who fall on the first try
and must repeat the test. Minimum competency exams can be a useful part of a CBEEES, but
other much more demanding curriculum-based exams signaling much higher levels of
performance are essential.
The requirement (# 4) that a CBEEE signal different levels of achievement (not just
whether the student has achieved a minimum) is essential because it has major effects on the
incentive effects of exams. By age 13 students differ dramatically in their levels of achievement.
On the National Assessment of Educational Progress, 7-9 percent of 13 year olds are four or
more grade level equivalents behind their age mates and 15-17 percent are four or more grade
level equivalents ahead of their age mates. When achievement differentials among students are
as large as this, incentives for effort are stronger for most students if the full range of
achievement is signaled rather than just whether the individual has passed some absolute
standard. When only a pass-fail signal is generated by a test, many students pass without
exertion and are, thus, not stimulated to greater effort by the reward for passing. Some of the
least well prepared students will judge the effort required to achieve the standard to be too great
and the benefits too small to warrant the effort. They give up on the idea of meeting the
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standard. Few students will find the reward for exceeding a single absolute cutoff an incentive
for greater effort Wang 1985). Costrell agrees: "The case for perfect information [making scores
on external examinations available rather than just whether the individual passed or failed]
would appear to be strong, if not airtight: for most plausible degrees of heterogeneity,
egalitarianism, and pooling under decentralization, perfect information not only raises GDP, but
also social welfare (1994, p. 970)."
The SAT-I reasoning tests are not curriculum based external exit exams because they
do not meet tests # 3 and # 5. They are not organized around school subjects and fail to assess
most of the material–history, science, economics, civics, literature, foreign languages and the
ability to write an essay–that high school students are expected to learn. The SAT was designed
from the beginning to minimize backwash effects on teaching and student study habits. Indeed,
Richard Gummere, Harvard College's admissions director at the time the machine scored
multiple-choice Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) replaced the curriculum-based essay style
College Board Examinations, was very candid about why the SAT had been adopted:
Learning in itself has ceased to be the main factor [in college admissions]. The aptitude
of the pupil is now the leading consideration (Gummere, 1943 p. 5).
The subject specific SAT-II achievement tests meet some of the requirements of a
CBEEE.  However, since colleges admit on the basis of the SAT-I, not SAT-Ils, the stakes are
low and few students take them. In 1982-83 only 6 percent of SAT-I test takers took a science
SAT-II and only 3 to 4 percent took one in history or a foreign language. Schools do not assume
responsibility for preparing students for SAT-II tests.
The Advanced Placement (AP) examinations are the one exception to the generalization
that the U.S. lacks national curriculum-based external exit examinations. While growing rapidly,
AP is still a very small program. In 1995 only 3.2 percent of juniors and seniors took AP English
or AP history exams and only 2 percent took AP calculus or science exams (National Education
Goals Panel 1995). Low participation means that AP exams fail requirement # 5 and are,
consequently, not a CBEEE system. They can, however, serve as a component of a larger
system.
2. Why are CBEEES Hypothesized to Increase Achievement?
Curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs) improve the signaling of academic
achievement. As a result, colleges and employers are likely to give greater weight to academic
achievement when they make admission and hiring decisions, so the rewards for learning
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should grow and become more visible. CBEEEs also shift attention towards measures of
absolute achievement and away from measures of relative achievement such as rank in class
and teacher grades.
Grading on a curve or basing college admissions on class rank give students a personal
interest in persuading each other not to study. The studious are called nerds or accused of
"acting white," in part, because they are making it more difficult for others to get top grades.
When exams are graded on a curve, joint welfare is maximized when no one studies. In the
repeated game that results, side payments–friendship and respect–and punishments–ridicule
and harassment–enforce the cooperative "don't study" solution. When, by contrast, learning is
assessed relative to an outside standard, students no longer have a personal interest in getting
teachers off track or persuading each other to refrain from studying.
In the absence of a CBEEES, school reputations are largely outside the control of school
staff; determined instead by the social class of the student body, mean SAT scores and by
numbers attending prestigious colleges. When a CBEEES is in place, exam results displace
social class as the primary determinant of school reputations and this in turn should induce
school staff to give enhanced learning higher priority. Teachers will upgrade curricula and
assign more homework and parents will demand better science labs and more rigorous
teaching. School administrators will be pressured to increase the time devoted to examination
subjects and hire more qualified teachers. The competition for teachers is likely to bid up
salaries.
A further benefit of CBEEES is the professional development that teachers receive when
they are brought to centralized locations to grade the extended answer portions of the
examinations. In May 1996 I interviewed a number of Alberta teachers about their experience
serving on grading committees. They all said that having to discuss and agree with their
colleagues about what constituted an excellent, good, adequate, poor, and failing response to
essay questions had been the best professional development experience they had since
entering the profession.
3. Do CBEEES Increase Achievement? A look at the Evidence.
The hypothesis that curriculum-based external exit examination systems improve
achievement will be tested by comparing nations, states and provinces that do and do not have
such systems. Four different data sets will be examined: science and mathematics achievement
in the 40 nation Third international Math and Science Study, science and math scores on the
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International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) for 16 nations and 9 Canadian
provinces and SAT test scores for New York State vs. the rest of the United States.
3.1 Third international Mathematics and Science Study–TIMSS:
The just released TIMSS provides 1994-95 data for 7th and 8th graders for 40 countries.
Comparative education studies and education encyclopedias were reviewed and embassy
personnel interviewed to determine which of the TIMSS nations have curriculum-based
externally-set exit examinations in secondary school. Twenty-one national school systems were
classified as having CBEEEs for both subjects in all parts of the country: Austria, Bulgaria,
Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Iran, Israel,
Japan, Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Scotland, Singapore, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia and Thailand. Three countries–-France, Iceland and Romania–had CBEEEs
in mathematics but not in science. Five countries–Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and
the United States–had CBEEEs in some provinces but not in others. Norway has regular exit
examinations in mathematics but examines science only every few years. A list of the interviews
conducted and books consulted is available from CAHRS. The countries classified as not
having a CBEEE in either subject were Belgium (both Flemish and French speaking systems),
Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Philippines, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Following Madeus and
Kelleghan (1991), the university entrance examinations in Greece, Portugal Spain, Cyprus and
the ACT and SAT in the U.S. were not considered to be CBEEEs. University entrance exams
should have much smaller incentive effects because students headed into the job market do not
take them and teachers can avoid responsibility for their students' exam results by arguing that
not everyone is college material or that examiners have set an unreasonably high standard to
limit enrollment in higher education.
Figures 1 and 2 array the 40 TIMSS countries by the science and mathematics
achievement of their 13 year olds. The US ranks # 15 in science and # 31 in mathematics. The
gaps between the vertical grid lines represents one U.S grade level equivalent-the difference
between 7th and 8th grade TIMSS test score means for the U.S. Achievement differentials across
nations are very large. In science Singapore, Korea, Bulgaria and Flemish Belgium are more
than 1 GLE ahead of the US and Columbia, Philippines, Lithuania, Romania and Portugal are
more than 3 GLEs behind. In mathematics Singapore, Korea, Japan and Hong Kong are 4 or
more grade level equivalents ahead of the U.S., while Columbia, Philippines and Iran are more
than 3 GLEs behind. The countries represented by a solid black bar in the figures have a
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curriculum-based external exit exam in the subject. Countries represented by white bars do not.
Note that the countries with a CBEEE in the subject tend to have higher TIMSS scores.
Regression Analysis: The mean 7th and 8th grade science and mathematics test scores
were regressed on per capita gross domestic product for 1987 and 1990 deflated by a
purchasing power parity price index, a dummy for East Asian nation and a dummy for CBEEEs.
The results presented in Table 1 indicate that test scores are significantly higher in more
developed nations, East Asian nations and in nations with a CBEEE.
The analysis of achievement at a particular grade level may be biased, however, by
differing policies regarding grade retention, age of school entry and which grade was chosen for
assessment. CBEEES, for example, might be associated with high rates of grade retention.
Therefore, a preferable dependent variable is a measure of student achievement at some fixed
age. The fourth and fifth rows of each panel present estimated models predicting the median
test score for each nation's 13 year olds (Beaton et al, 1996a,b, Table 1.5). For countries not
included in this table, the 13 year old median was estimated by age adjusting the 7th a d 8th
grade means. Switching to the age constant achievement reduces the estimated impact of the
CBEEES. Using two tail t tests, the CBEEES coefficient has a P = .11 on a in the mathematics
model and a P = .01 in the science model. The estimated impacts are substantively important:
1.3 U.S. grade level equivalents in science and .9 U.S. grade level equivalents in mathematics.
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Table 1
The Effect of Curriculum-Based External Exams
on Science and Mathematics Achievement
(Analysis of 1994-95 TIMSS data)
External LnGDP/Pop East $K- 12 AdjR2/
TIMSS Science-1994 Exit Exam 1987 & 90 Asia 1GDP RMSE
(U.S. GLE = 26)
Mean for 7th Graders 37.3*** 45.2*** 19.6 .320
(2.95) (3.33) (1.19) 35.4
Mean for 8th Graders 40.8*** 34.9*** 13.8 .357
(3.33) (3.65) (.87) 34.6
Mean for 8th Graders 38.7*** 30.7*** 21.5 8.3 .360
(3.08) (2.93) (1.25) (1.10) 34.9
Median for 13 Yr Olds 34.3*** 44.0*** 20.8 .403
(2.79) (4.58) (1.31) 34.7
Median for 13 Yr Olds 31.2*** 37.1*** 32.9* 13.5* .441
(2.56) (3.63) (1.95) (1.83) 34.0
TIMSS Mathematics-1994
(U.S. GLE = 24)
Mean for 7th Graders 26.1* 45.2*** 65.7*** .458
(1.89) (4.47) (3.95) 36.6
Mean for 8th Graders 32.1** 47.6*** 61.7*** .462
(2.31) (4.65) (3.67) 37.1
Mean for 8th Graders 29.9** 46.7*** 65.6*** 3.1 .456
(2.08) (4.11) (3.55) (.38) 37.7
Median for 13 Yr Olds 21.8 55.3*** 69.2*** .529
(1.64) (5.65) (4.32) 35.4
Median for 13 Yr Olds 18.5 53.1*** 75.8*** 5.8 .534
(1.37) (4.98) (4.36) (.76) 35.6
IAEP-1991
Science % Correct 4.3 1.7 9.6** .436
(U.S. GLE = 6) (1.72) (.61) (2.81) 4.0
Math % Correct 15.7*** 3.7 16. 1 ** .641
(U.S. GLE = 8) (3.85) (.25) (2.81) 6.0
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3.2 Analysis of the 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress
The 1991 International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP) is the second data
set in which CBEEE effects can be tested. Fifteen nations are available for the analysis:
England, France, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Emilia Romagna/Northern Italy, Korea, Portugal,
Scotland, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States.
The average percent correct (adjusted for guessing) for 13 year old students was regressed on
the same set of variables as in the analysis of the TIMSS data. The results are presented in the
second panel of Table 1. For mathematics the effect of curriculum-based external exams is
highly significant and quite large. Since the U.S. standard deviation was 26.8 percentage points
in mathematics, the CBEEE effect on math was more than one-half of a U.S. standard deviation
or about 2 U.S. grade level equivalents. CBEEEs had a smaller non-significant effect on science
achievement. East Asian students scored significantly higher than students in Europe and North
America. Coefficients on per capita GDP were positive but not statistically significant.
These results are consistent with the causal hypotheses presented above. Causation is
not proved, however, because other explanations can no doubt be proposed. Other sources of
variation in curriculum based exams need to be analyzed. Best of all would be studies that hold
national culture constant. Two such studies will be presented: one comparing Canadian
provinces, the other comparing U.S. states.
3.3 Comparing Canadian Provinces
In 1990-91, the year the IAEP data was being collected, Alberta, British Columbia,
Newfoundland, Quebec and Francophone New Brunswick had curriculum-based provincial
examinations in English, French, mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics during the senior
year of high school. These exams accounted for 50 percent of that year's final grade in Alberta,
Newfoundland and Quebec and 40 percent in British Columbia. The other provinces did not
have curriculum-based provincial external exit examinations in 1990-9 . Ontario eliminated
them in 1967, Manitoba in 1970 and Nova Scotia in 1972. Anglophone New Brunswick had
provincial exams in language arts and mathematics but exam grades were not reported on
transcripts or counted in final course grades. Canadian provincial exams are medium stakes,
not high stakes tests. They influence grades but passing the examination is not essential for
graduation. Employers appear uninterested in exam scores. Job application forms do not
request that applicants report exam scores or grades.
The principals of schools sampled by IAEP completed questionnaires describing school
policies, school resources and the qualifications of 8th grade mathematics and science teachers.
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Students were asked about books in the home, number of siblings, language spoken at home,
hours of TV, hours doing homework, pleasure reading, watching science programs on TV,
parental oversight of school work and teaching methods of teachers.
The effects of curriculum-based provincial exit exams taken by 12th graders on
achievement and the behavior of Canadian 13 year olds, their parents, teachers and school
administrators were examined by estimating models predicting these behaviors using schools
as observations. The data set comprises 1354 Canadian and 106 U.S. schools. The model
contained 9 variables: logarithm of the mean number of books in the home, the mean number of
siblings, the proportion of the school's students whose home language was different from the
language of instruction, logarithm of the number of students per grade in the school and
dummies for religiously controlled school, secular non-public schools, French speaking schools,
a dummy for U.S. school and EXAM province.
Table 2 presents regression results predicting 4 achievement outcomes, 12 measures of
school administrator behavior, 9 teacher behaviors and 11 student/parent attitudes and
behaviors.  The first column presents the hypothesized sign of the relationship between
CBEEES and that variable. The means and standard deviations across schools of each
dependent variable are presented in columns 2 and 3. The coefficient for EXAM and its T
statistic are presented in columns 4 and 5. The R2 corrected for degrees of freedom is reported
in column 14. Provincial exit exams had very large effects on achievement: 24 percent of a U.S.
standard deviation (about four-fifths of a U.S. grade level equivalent) in mathematics and 17.6
percent of a standard deviation (about three-fifths of a grade level equivalent) in science.
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Effect of CBEEES on Behavior of Students, Teachers and Administrators: Exit exams
also apparently affected the behavior of parents, teachers and school administrators. Parents in
these provinces were more likely to talk to their children about their math and science classes
and their children were more likely to report that their parents "are interested in science" or
"want me to do well in math." Schools in exit exam provinces scheduled more hours of math
and science instruction, assigned more homework, had better science labs, were significantly
more likely to use specialist teachers for math and science and more likely to hire math and
science teachers who had studied the subject in college. Eighth grade teachers in exam
provinces gave tests and quizzes more frequently. Hours in the school year, class size and
teacher prep time were not significantly affected by CBEEES.
Opponents of externally set curriculum-based examinations predict that they will cause
students to avoid learning activities that do not enhance exam scores. This hypothesis was
operationalized by testing whether exam systems were associated with less reading for pleasure
and less watching of science programs like NOVA and Nature. Neither of these hypotheses is
supported. Indeed students in exam provinces spent significantly more time reading for
pleasure, more time watching science programs on TV, while watching significantly less TV
overall.
Attitudes Toward Science
Do CBEEEs skew teaching in undesirable ways? Madeus has pointed out that
"preparation for high stakes tests often emphasizes rote memorization and cramming of
students and drill and practice teaching methods" an  that "some kinds of teaching to the test
permit students to do well in examinations without recourse to higher levels of cognitive activity
(1991 p. 7-8)." Contrary to this hypothesis, however, students did more (not fewer) experiments
in science class and emphasis on computation using whole numbers–a skill that should be
learned by the end of 5th grade-declined significantly. Apparently, teachers subject to the subtle
pressure of a provincial exam four years in the future adopt strategies that are conventionally
viewed as 'best practice," not strategies designed to maximize scores on multiple choice tests.
Students responded to the improved teaching by becoming more likely to report that science
was "useful in everyday life."  The data provided no support for our hypothesis that CBEEES
would induce employers to pay greater attention to high school achievement, students in exam
provinces were not more likely to believe that math was important in getting a good job and were
less likely to believe that science was important in job hunting.
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One possible skeptical response to these findings is to point out that the correlation
between EXAM and other outcomes may not be causal. Maybe the people of Alberta, British
Columbia, Newfoundland, Quebec and Francophone New Brunswick–the provinces with exam
systems-place higher priority on education than the rest of the nation. Maybe this trait also
results in greater political support for examination systems. If so, we would expect that schools
in the exam provinces should be better than schools in other provinces along other dimensions
such as discipline and absenteeism, not just by academic criteria. Bishop (1996) predicts, to the
contrary, that exam systems induce students and schools to redirect resources and attention to
learning/teaching exam subjects and away from the achievement of other goals such as low
absenteeism and good discipline. These competing hypotheses are evaluated in the 3rd a d 4th
row of Table 2. Contrary to the "provincial taste for education" hypothesis, principals in exam
provinces did not report significantly fewer discipline problems and were significantly more likely
to report absenteeism problems.
Effectiveness of Non-Public Schools: In their influential 1990 book, John Chubb and
Terry Moe argued that the constraints placed on public schools by bureaucracy and democratic
government make them inherently less effective than non-public schools that must compete for
students and that are, thus, required to survive a market test. Clearly, however, their theory
does not apply to Canada. The students at the small number of secular nonpublic schools did
better than public school students in mathematics but not in science. However, most of
Canada's nonpublic schools were started by religious denominations. When background
characteristics of the students were controlled, students at religiously controlled schools knew
considerably less math and science at age 13 than public school students. This occurred
despite that fact that the students at parochial schools were more likely to believe that math and
science was useful in everyday life or important in getting a good job and had parents who were
more interested in their school performance. The difference appears to result from the quality
and amount of instruction students at parochial schools received. Students got 13 percent less
science instruction time and worked in laboratories that were clearly inferior to those in public
middle schools. Their teachers were less likely to be specializing in teaching the subject and
less likely to have studied the subject in college.
3.4 The Impact on New York State Regents Examinations
In the early 1990s, New York State was the only state with a CBEEE System. It has
been administering curriculum-based Regents Examinations to high school students ever since
June 1878.
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As Sherman Tinkelman, Assistant Commissioner for Examinations and Scholarships
described in a 1966 report:
The Regents examinations are closely related to the curriculum in New York State. They
are, as you can see, inseparably intertwined. One supports and reinforces the other....
These instruments presuppose and define standards.... They are a strong supervisory
and instructional tool–and deliberately so. They are effective in stimulating good teaching
and good learning practices (Tinkelman, 1966 p. 12).
The examinations are taken throughout one's high school career. A student taking a full
schedule of college preparatory Regents courses would typically take Regents exams in
mathematics and earth science at the end of 9th grade; mathematics, biology and global studies
exams at the end of 10th grade; mathematics, chemistry, English and foreign language exams at
the end of 11th grade and mathematics and physics exams at the end of 12th grade.
In 1993, about 56 percent of 9th graders took the Mathematics Course 1 exam and, of
these, 24 percent scored below the 65% passing grade. Similar proportions of 10th and 1 th
graders took the global studies, biology and English exams. Failure rates were 20 percent in
global studies, 18 percent in biology and 13 percent in English. Those not taking Regents exams
were typically in courses that were considerably less challenging than Regents level courses. A
system of minimum competency tests in specific subjects set a minimum standard for those not
taking Regents courses but, as in other states, the passing standard was low. Of the 50 states,
New York was the only one with such a system in the early 1990s.
Impacts on Achievement
New York's students are more disadvantaged, more heavily minority and more likely to
be foreign born than students in most other states. Among northern states, only Maryland,
Delaware and Illinois have a larger share of African-American pupils. Nationwide, only California
has a higher share of its population foreign born and only California, Texas, Arizona, New
Mexico and Colorado have larger Hispanic population shares. Literacy levels among adults are
substantially below the national average (NEGP 1993, Vol 2).
Consequently, when one compares student achievement levels, family background must
be taken into account. Considering the high incidence of at-risk children, New York students do
remarkably well. The proportion of students taking algebra, calculus, chemistry and physics is
generally above national averages. A larger proportion of New York's 11th and 2th graders are
taking and passing (9.4 percent) AP exams in English, science, math or history than any other
state except Utah (NGEP 1993, Vol. 2).
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Graham and Husted's (1993) analysis of SAT test scores in the 37 states with
reasonably large test taking populations found that New York State students did better than
comparable students in other states. They did not, however, test the statistical significance of
the New York State effect and used an unusual log-log specification.
Table 3 presents the results of a linear regression predicting 1991 mean SAT-M + -V
test scores for the 37 states for which data are available. With the exception of the dummy
variable for New York State, all right hand side variables are proportions–generally the share of
the test taking population with the characteristic described. Clearly, New Yorkers do significantly
better on the SAT than students of the same race and social background living in other states.
When this model is estimated without the NYS dummy variable, New York has the largest
positive residual in the sample. The next largest (Wisconsin's) positive residual is 87 percent of
New York's residual. Illinois and Nevada have positive residuals that are about 58 percent of
New York's value. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas and Washington have negative residuals greater than 10 points. Many of these states
have large populations of Hispanics and recent immigrants, a trait that was not controlled for in
the analysis. This makes New York's achievement all the more remarkable when one considers
that Hispanics and immigrants are a large share of its school children.
For individuals the summed SAT-V + SAT-M has a standard deviation of approximately
200 points. Consequently, the differential between New York State's SAT mean and the
prediction for New York based on outcomes in the other 36 states is about 20 percent of a
standard deviation or about three-quarters of a grade level equivalent.
Adding the teacher-pupil ratio and spending per pupil to the model, reduces the NYS
coefficient by 25 percent. It remains significantly greater than zero, however. The significant
coefficient on teacher-pupil ratio suggests that heavy investment in K-12 schooling in New York
State (possibly stimulated in part by the Regents exam system) may be one of the reasons why
New York state student perform better than comparable students in other states.
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Table 3
Determinants of Mean Total SAT-I Scores for States
NYS Partic Parents Private Prop. Large 3+Math 3+Eng. InTeach InExpend R2
Rate AA-BA+ School Black School Courses Courses /stud /stud RMSE
46**  -68** 370*** 60 -135***  -44* 85 -36 .926
(2.7) (2.6) (6.4) (1.6) (3.2) (1.8) (1.3) (.3) 14.8
35* -88*** 367*** 69* -113 -36 45 -45 48* 13 .933
(2.0) (3.3) (6.6) (1.9) (2.6) (1.5) .7) -4) (1.7) -8) 14.2
SAT-I
Mean .027 .414 .581 .207 .078 .129 .617 .797 -2.822 1.648 925
SD .164 .240 .097 .082 .064 .113 .067 .038 .113 .215 55
*** p < .01 on a two tail test
**   p < .05 on a two tail test
*     p < .10 on a two tail test
Does New York State Invest More in K-12 Education?
The theory predicts that the existence of CBEEES will induce New York State to spend
more on K-12 education and focus that spending on instruction. Indeed, New York's ratio of
K-12 teacher salaries to college faculty salaries is significantly above average. New York
teachers are also more likely to have master's degrees than the teachers of any state except
Connecticut and Indiana. New York ranks number 7 in both the teacher-pupil ratios and the ratio
of per pupil spending to gross state product per capita (Bishop 1996).
Clearly, New York invests a great deal in its K-12 education system. If the cause of the
high spending were a strong general commitment to education or legislative profligacy, we
would expect spending to be high on both K-12 and higher education. This is not the case. New
York is number 1 in the ratio of K-12 spending per pupil to higher education spending per
college student.
The Regents exams are currently "medium" stakes tests, not "high" stakes tests.  Exam
grades count for less than a third of the final grade in the course and influence only the type of
diploma received. Employers ignore exam results when they make hiring decisions. During the
1980s, scholarships sponsored by the Regents were based on aptitude test scores, not Regents
exam results. A passing score on Regents exams is not necessary for admission to community
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colleges or out of state colleges. Students were aware that they could avoid Regents courses
and still go to college. Indeed some perceived an advantage to avoiding them:
My counselor wanted me to take Regents history and I did for a while. But it was pretty
hard and the teacher moved fast. I switched to the other history and I'm getting better
grades.  So my average will be better for college.  Unless you are going to a college in
state, it doesn't really matter whether you get a Regent's diploma.  (Ward, 1994)
This is about to change. The Board of Regents has announced that students graduating
in the year 2000 must take a new six-hour Regents English examination and pass it at the 55%
level. The class of 2001 has the additional requirement of passing a six-hour examination in
algebra and geometry. The class of 2002 must also pass two six-hour Regents examinations in
global studies and American history. When laboratory science exams come on stream, the
phase in of all five new required Regents exams will be completed with the graduating class of
2003. Once the system has adjusted to the new exams, the Regents intend to raise the scores
necessary to pass from the 55% to 60% and then to 65%.
Conclusions
Our review of the evidence suggests that the claims of the advocates of standards and
examination-based reform of American secondary education may be right. The countries and
Canadian provinces with such systems outperform other countries at a comparable level of
development. New York State, the only state with a CBEEES, does remarkably well on the SAT
test when student demography is held constant. CBEEES are, however, probably not the most
important determinant of achievement levels. CBEEES are common in developing nations
where achievement levels are often quite low [e.g. Columbia and Iran]. Belgium, by contrast,
has a top quality education system without having a CBEEES. More research on the effects of
CBEEES is clearly in order.
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